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Abstract
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) remains a notable disease and
poses a significant threat to global public health. The Arabian Peninsula is considered a
major global epicentre for the disease and the virus has crossed regional and continental
boundaries since 2012. In this study, we focused on exploring the temporal dynamics of
MERS-CoV in human populations in the Arabian Peninsula between 2012 and 2017, using
publicly available data on case counts and combining two analytical methods. Disease progres-
sion was assessed by quantifying the time-dependent reproductive number (TD-Rs), while case
series temporal pattern was modelled using the AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average
(ARIMA). We accounted for geographical variability between three major affected regions in
Saudi Arabia including Eastern Province, Riyadh and Makkah. In Saudi Arabia, the epidemic
size was large with TD-Rs >1, indicating significant spread until 2017. In both Makkah and
Riyadh regions, the epidemic progression reached its peak in April 2014 (TD-Rs > 7), during
the highest incidence period of MERS-CoV cases. In Eastern Province, one unique super-
spreading event (TD-R > 10) was identified in May 2013, which comprised of the most notable
cases of human-to-human transmission. Best-fitting ARIMA model inferred statistically sig-
nificant biannual seasonality in Riyadh region, a region characterised by heavy seasonal
camel-related activities. However, no statistical evidence of seasonality was identified in
Eastern Province and Makkah. Instead, both areas were marked by an endemic pattern of
cases with sporadic outbreaks. Our study suggested new insights into the epidemiology of
the virus, including inferences about epidemic progression and evidence for seasonality.
Despite the inherent limitations of the available data, our conclusions provide further guidance
to currently implement risk-based surveillance in high-risk populations and, subsequently,
improve related interventions strategies against the epidemic at country and regional levels.
Introduction
The first case of the novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was
observed in June 2012 in Saudi Arabia [1]. Subsequently, the disease has caused more than
1500 confirmed human infections with more than 580 deaths. It spread from the Arabian
Peninsula to other Middle Eastern countries from 2012 to 2018 [2, 3]. Furthermore, since
2012, MERS-CoV has jumped across continental boundaries to Europe, Northern America
[4] and recently South Korea [5], which has brought global attention to the serious implica-
tions of this disease. MERS-CoV remains a notable disease and poses a significant threat to
global public health, especially during mass gathering events. Thus, MERS-CoV has also
become a compelling example of an emerging disease with pandemic potential due to its con-
tinuous circulation in Makkah, which hosts one of the most important global mass gathering
events (i.e. the Hajj pilgrimage), where more than 2 millions of people gather from dozens of
countries annually [6].
MERS-CoV causes new infections both through zoonotic and human-to-human transmis-
sion [7, 8]. Bats are implicated as the primary reservoir of the virus, but no evidence suggests a
direct transmission route from bats to humans [9]. Several studies implicate Dromedary camels
as the primary intermediate hosts and source of zoonotic introductions. Camel-to-human
transmission appears to be through direct contact or consumption of camel products [10],
while prolonged contact among human hosts is documented as the main route for
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human-to-human transmission [8]. Camel-to-human and
human-to-human transmission have been well described in Saudi
Arabia [11], while in South Korea, it is apparent that the infections
are entirely human-to-human [12].
In the Arabian Peninsula, sporadic cases and small outbreaks
were detected in humans in United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Yemen between 2012 and 2016 [13].
The highest numbers of cases were observed in Saudi Arabia
between 2012 and 2018, which constituted more than 90% of
the cases in the region [3]. The first human case of MERS-CoV
was observed in June 2012 in Asir Province, located in the south-
west of Saudi Arabia [14]. However, the first outbreak was not
detected until 2013 in Eastern Province, with more than 70 con-
firmed cases, followed by Riyadh in central Saudi Arabia, with
more than 60 confirmed cases [15]. The most notable outbreak
was observed in the spring of 2014 with more than 500 confirmed
cases in Makkah Province (western Saudi Arabia) and Riyadh
[13]. To date, MERS-CoV human cases are continuously detected
and confirmed every month in Saudi Arabia. Hence, the Arabian
Peninsula is currently considered as the most critical global epi-
centre for MERS-CoV.
Some studies have suggested that observed outbreaks are sea-
sonal [16]. However, MERS-CoV cases have been reported
throughout the year, indicating a sporadic occurrence of infection.
In Saudi Arabia, there was an initial increase in the number of the
observed cases in the spring of 2013, which was attributed to zoo-
notic infection resulting from direct contact with infected young
camels [7]. In the spring of 2014, the exponential increase in
the number of cases was attributed to limitations in infection con-
trol and prevention within local health-care facilities [17]. Many
rigorous modelling efforts were made for both periods to identify
risk factors and spreading patterns of the disease on local and glo-
bal levels [18, 19]. Such studies filled critical knowledge gaps in
the epidemiology of MERS-CoV. However, data available from
the earlier periods of the epidemic was severely lacking and suf-
fered from many biases compared with data collected between
2015 and 2017 [20]. This is attributed to the fact that many
aspects of MERS-CoV were unknown in the earlier period of
the epidemic and therefore data collection was not methodical.
To date, several modelling studies have attempted to character-
ise both the spatial and temporal dynamics of the MERS-CoV epi-
demic in the Arabian Peninsula, with the ultimate goal of guiding
surveillance, control and prevention activities [21, 22]. However,
such studies suffered from the discrepancies and coarseness of
publicly available data, which weakened the robustness of their
inferences [21–23]. Inferences related to epidemic spread and
introductions failed to identify evidence for seasonality. This
has been attributed to either under-reporting or neglecting the
significant number of asymptomatic or mild cases [21].
Unfortunately, such limitations cannot be avoided due to eco-
nomic, cultural and religious issues, as well as inconsistent surveil-
lance capabilities within the countries of the Arabian Peninsula.
Characterizing epidemic spread from surveillance data needs
to account for various assumptions and uncertainties. The basic
reproductive number, R0, is a commonly used parameter for
quantifying epidemic spread and is defined as the average number
of secondary cases produced by a primary case in a susceptible
population [24]. Breban et al. [25] estimated the first R0 for
MERS-CoV and suggested that its magnitude was comparable
to a pre-epidemic phase of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in eastern Asia in 2002. Estimates about the incidence
of cases and their temporal patterns are also important
epidemiological parameters for measuring epidemic dynamics
[26]. Recently, novel analytical methods for temporal data have
been developed to model discrete time series of case incidence.
Such analytical methods account for undetected cases, periodicity
and under-reporting [27]. Many aspects of MERS-CoV transmis-
sion dynamics remains unknown or uncertain. For example, does
R0 vary through time or across geographical regions in the
Arabian Peninsula? Were there any significant seasonal compo-
nents in the temporal patterns of the disease? Finally, how do
the inferred estimates of MERS-CoV transmission dynamics
change when including data collected from recent years?
In this study, we explore the temporal dynamics of MERS-CoV
in human populations in the Arabian Peninsula between 2012
and 2017, combining two analytical methods. We quantified the
spread of disease during different endemic and epidemic periods
at the region and country level, and modelled the temporal
dynamics of the disease during endemic periods using time series
data at different spatial levels. Our objectives are to infer epidemic
spread over time, identify baseline patterns of infection, and
quantify seasonality and trends at different regional levels. Our
ultimate goal is to present the potential of combining both meth-
ods in order to provide new insights that can help the decision-
making process for allocating efficient intervention strategies
and update the epidemiological knowledge about the temporal
dynamics of MERS-CoV in the region.
Material and methods
Data source
The study region included countries of the Arabian Peninsula,
referred to officially as the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) coun-
tries, which includes Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United
Arab Emirates and Yemen. We retrieved and merged data from
three publicly available disease databases, namely the World Health
Organization (WHO) [3], Global Animal Disease Information
System (EMPRES-i) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) [28], and Saudi Arabia Ministry of
Health web page (MoH) [2]. Thus, the final dataset compromised
1488 observed (date of case observation) and 1710 reported (date
of reporting by the official government and international entities)
human cases between June 2012 and July 2017 and from
September 2012 to July 2017, respectively (Fig. 1a). We aggregated
longitudinal data to weeks to reduce the number of time periods
with zero cases within the discrete interval series and to avoid week-
end effects.We then plotted and compared epidemic curves for both
observed and reported cases. We used Wilcoxon signed-rank test to
verify that there were no significant differences between the median
of weekly observed and reported cases.
Since 95% of the cases were reported in Saudi Arabia (Fig. 1b), we
further stratified our time series to plot and compare epidemic curves
for three geographical regions within Saudi Arabia where the highest
number of cases were observed and reported (Riyadh, Makkah and
Eastern Province). Thus, our final dataset compromised four (GCC
countries, Riyadh, Makkah and Eastern Province) discrete interval
time series with 267 temporal units at the week level.
Estimation of the time-dependent effective reproductive
numbers
We used the likelihood-based approach utilised for the 2002
SARS epidemic, as described elsewhere [29], to estimate effective
2 M. A. Alkhamis et al.
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time-dependent reproductive numbers (TD-Rs) of MERS-CoV
between June 2012 and July 2017 for different geographical
regions. Briefly, the method averages over all potential disease
transmission networks compatible with the observed cases to
compute reproductive numbers for each point of time since the
onset of the epidemic [29]. In this study, TD-Rs were calculated
for each week of the epidemic starting from the onset week of
the outbreak. We performed the analysis using the R package
‘R0’ [30]. As part of this process, we estimated the serial interval
distribution of the generation time (GT), which is defined as the
time of reporting the first primary case to the reporting of the sec-
ondary case [31]. The GT was estimated from the time lag
between consecutively reported cases and its mean and standard
deviation were calculated from the observed epidemic curve. We
estimated the TD-Rs for the epidemic as the sum of the probabil-
ities that a given case was the source of infection for subsequent
cases based on elapsed time. We obtained 95% confidence inter-
vals (CI) through 10 000 simulations [30]. Inferred TD-Rs with
95% CI that do not include one are interpreted as significant
spreading events, while TD-Rs > 10 are interpreted as significant
super-spreading events [29].
Fitting time series using ARIMA models with trend and
seasonality patterns
AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models
have become popular tools for analyzing time-series data in
both veterinary and public health disciplines [32]. ARIMA
models can be used for short-term forecasting of acute infectious
disease incidences like influenza and hence aid in disease inter-
vention strategies [33]. Classically, ARIMA( p,q) models are
defined in the following way:
Xt = m+ f1Xt−1 + f2Xt−2 + · · · + fpXt−p + Zt + u1Zt−1
+ u2Zt−2 + · · · + uqZt−q, (1)
where Xt denotes the number of reported cases at time t, μ is an
intercept, φ1, φ2, …, φp, are the coefficients of autoregressive
terms, θ1, θ2, …, θq are the coefficients of moving average
terms, and Zt, Zt–1, …, Zt–q are the terms of the model which
are normally distributed. These models assume that the time ser-
ies is stationary and there are no trend or seasonality patterns.
Usually, investigators eliminate potential linear trends and sea-
sonality by differentiating the time series [34]. However, trend
and seasonality can be included in model (1) as interpretable
terms, hence avoiding losing this information. We included
trend and seasonality patterns in the stationary ARIMA( p,q)
model through considering the following extended model:
Yt = g0 + g1t + g2 sin
2pt
T1
( )
+ g3 cos
2pt
T1
( )
+ g4 sin
2pt
T2
( )
+ g5 cos
2pt
T2
( )
+ Xt, (2)
Fig. 1. Epidemic curve of observed and reported human cases of Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the Arabian Peninsula aggregated
by week from June 2012 to July 2017. (a) Epidemic of all cases observed and reported in all Arabian Peninsula countries; (b) countries of the Arabian Peninsula and
their numbers of reported cases. Regional epidemic curves of observed and reported cases in (c) Eastern Province, (d) Riyadh and (e) Makkah. Numbers of reported
cases are presented in the boxes adjucent to each country.
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where Yt is the observed series, T1 and T2 are different periods of
seasonality of the series, the parameter γ1 captures the possible
linear trend of the series, while the parameters γ2, γ3, γ4 and γ5
capture the corresponding seasonality profiles. Xt is the ARIMA
( p,d,q) model expressed in (1). The trigonometric parts imple-
mented in the model are first- and second-order Fourier terms
[34], which are frequently used in time-series analysis. We esti-
mated the parameters of the series Xt, φ1, φ2, …, φp, θ1, θ2, …,
θq and the covariates γ0, γ1, …, γ5 using a maximum likelihood
approach. The model (1) was estimated using the arima function
in R by including suitable covariates in the classical ARIMA( p,q),
leading to the model (2). Three criteria were taken into account
for fitting the most appropriate model: (1) the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), (2) the significance of the model’s
parameters and (3) the validation of the residuals. We selected
the final model based on the balance between these three criteria.
Several abnormally large peaks corresponding to the epidemic in
the selected Saudi regions were observed in the selected time-series
data, between 2012 and 2017. These peaks, considered outliers in
the context of classical ARIMA modelling, which consequently
caused overdispersion in our selected models and severely skewed
our forecasting results. Thus, we derived a threshold value to deal
with from these abnormally large peaks in the time-series data.
We computed this threshold through the mean plus 2.5 times the
standard deviation of the sample from the series of Riyad and
Makkah. As a result, thresholds of 20.86 and 20.59 cases for the
Riyad and Makkah series, respectively, were obtained. The series
of Eastern Province was not considered in this process due to its
high frequency of zeros in its case-series data (more than 80%).
Thus, we selected the threshold of 20 cases and subsequently
attempted three different sensitivity analyses methods to deal
such abnormally large peaks in the case-series data, as well as to
assess the selected threshold of 20 cases on the forecasting results:
(a) impute peaks with more than 20 cases and define them as miss-
ing values in the context of ARIMAmodels; (b) replacing peakswith
more than 20 cases with the maximum values of the series previous
to those abnormal values; and (c) replace peaks with more than 20
by the predictions provided by a linear regression in which both the
trend and seasonal components were included as covariates.
Results
Preliminary results
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicated no significant difference
(P-values <0.05) between observed and reported cases with a
median difference of approximately 1.2 weeks between the date
of observation and reporting (8 days). Therefore, we decided to
use the reporting date series for all temporal analyses, in which
the final count of cases matched those of both WHO and MoH
databases for the GCC countries, because in 20.8% of cases the
observation date information was missing.
Results of the sensitivity analyses for handling peaks with more
than 20 cases, as described above, suggests that all of the three
methods produced similar results. Therefore, we decided to select
the method (a) for all of the three Saudi regions due to its simpli-
city and epidemiological plausibility.
MERS-CoV epidemic spread
In Saudi Arabia, approximately 47% of reported and observed
cases were in Riyadh, followed by Makkah (∼26%) and Eastern
Province (∼12%) (Fig. 1). The epidemic curve of all observed
cases in the Arabian Peninsula demonstrated a marked peak in
April and May 2014, but regular small peaks afterward until
2017 (Fig. 1a). However, the epidemic curve of Eastern Province
showed that the highest number of observed cases was in April
and May 2013 (Fig. 1c), while the epidemic curve of Riyadh
showed two large distinct peaks in spring of 2014 and fall of
2015 (Fig. 1d). The epidemic curve of Makkah showed only one
distinct peak in 2014 (Fig. 1e).
Figure 2 illustrates the temporal patterns of the inferred TD-Rs
throughout the study period in the selected geographical regions.
On the level of the Arabian Peninsula, we inferred 12 time periods
where TD-Rs were significant (TD-Rs > 1 case) (Fig. 2a and
Table 1). Seven out of the 12 significant spreading events were
inferred in the spring of 2014 (Fig. 2a and Table 1), while three
significant spreading events inferred in 2015 (one in the winter
and two in the fall; Fig. 2a and Table 1). Interestingly, our inferred
estimates for the epidemic spread suggested two significant
spreading events occurred in the early summer of 2017 (Fig. 2a
and Table 1). We inferred three, seven and five significant spread-
ing events in Eastern Province, Riyadh and Makkah, respectively
(Fig. 2 and Table 1). In addition, one of the three inferred signifi-
cant spreading events in the Eastern Province was a distinct
super-spreading event (TD-R > 10) in May 2013 (Fig. 2 and
Table 1). No significant TD-Rs were inferred in 2017 in Eastern
Province and Riyadh (Fig. 2 and Table 1). However, two signifi-
cant spreading events were inferred in January 2017 in Makkah
(Fig. 2 and Table 1).
Time-series analysis of weekly cases of MERS-CoV
Figure 3 shows the reported weekly MERS-CoV cases in three
selected regions of Saudi Arabia, as well as the fitted series and
their corresponding 95% confidence limits. The series of
Eastern Province ranges from 0 to 26 weekly MERS-CoV cases,
with a median of 0 cases per week. According to the results of
models (1) and (2), the best model corresponds to an ARIMA
(3,0,1) leading to the equation illustrated in Table 2. The
Eastern Province best-fitting model predicted a mean of one
case per week and a 95% CI between zero and eight cases, suggest-
ing an endemic pattern with no seasonality (Fig. 1a; Table 2). The
Riyadh series ranges from zero to 46 cases, with a median of one
case per week. The best-fitting model for the Riyadh region cor-
responded to an ARIMA (2,0,0) (Table 2) with biannual season-
ality (T2 = 26 weeks; Fig. 3b). This selected model predicted a
mean of two cases per week and a 95% CI between zero and 18
cases, suggesting a biannual seasonal pattern in the Riyadh region.
Finally, the series of Makkah ranges from to zero to 70 cases per
week. Similar to the Eastern Province region, the best-fitting
model (Table 2) predicted a mean of one case per week and a
95% CI between zero and 17 cases (Fig. 3c), suggesting an
endemic pattern with no seasonal components. The small value
of standard errors for models’ coefficients and their correspond-
ing AIC values indicate statistical robustness of the selected
ARIMA models (Table 2).
Discussion
Over 85% of the observed MERS-CoV cases were reported in
Saudi Arabia (Fig. 1b), hence our significantly inferred TD-Rs
(>1 case) reflect a relatively large epidemic size, mainly on the
level of Saudi Arabia, with significant progression till 2017. Our
4 M. A. Alkhamis et al.
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Fig. 2. Inferred time-dependent reproductive numbers (TD-Rs) and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) for Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) in the Arabian Peninsula from June 2012 to July 2017. (a) TD-Rs and their 95% CI of reported cases in all Arabian Peninsula countries; (b) TD-Rs
and their 95% CI of reported cases in Eastern Province; (c) TD-Rs and their 95% CI of reported cases in Riyadh; (d) TD-Rs and their 95% CI of reported cases
in Makkah. The arrow in (b) indicates a super-spreading event (TD-R > 10).
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estimated regional-level TD-Rs ranged between 1.19 and 4.01
(Fig. 2a and Table 1), with the first significant TD-R inferred in
March 2014 and the most recent significant TD-R inferred in
June 2017. The largest TD-Rs (>3) occurred in April 2014
(Fig. 2a and Table 1), which suggested that the number of
secondary cases caused by a primary case reached its maximum
peak during this particular period of time [29]. That said, a
super-spreading event (>10 cases) [29] was identified in May of
2013 in Eastern Province (Fig. 2b and Table 1). Furthermore,
this unique super-spreading event was preceded by the largest sig-
nificant non-super spreading event (i.e. approximately eight cases;
Table 1) in April 2013 on the level of Saudi Arabia. Given that the
highest number of cases were reported in 2014 (≈46%), this
strongly suggests that epidemic progression reached its peak in
2013 and not 2014 as indicated by the non-stratified TD-R ana-
lysis and as suggested elsewhere [22]. Indeed, the 2013 super-
spreading event in the Eastern province was comprised of the
most notable cases of human-to-human transmission in Saudi
Arabia [35]. This cluster was made up of males and females
with a median age of 56 years and were all confined in a single
health facility [15].
In both Makkah and Riyadh regions, the epidemic progression
reached its peak (i.e. >7; Table 1) in April 2014. Those uniquely
large spreading events of MERS-CoV between 2013 and 2014 in
the three geographical regions of Saudi Arabia can be explained
by the fact that knowledge of MERS-CoV transmission between
hosts was lacking; camels were not heavily implicated as a primary
intermediate host during the first 2 years of the epidemic in the
region [36]. This hindered the success of control and prevention
campaigns and, subsequently, led the epidemic to expand up until
the first quarter of 2014. However, the role of camels in the trans-
mission of MERS-CoV was been confirmed through the active
intensive surveillance campaign conducted throughout Arabia
in 2014 [37–40]. Furthermore, the development of laboratory
diagnostic methods had reached a milestone in 2014, which
increased the capacity for detecting of cases in both humans
and animals [41, 42]. These advancements in surveillance and
diagnostic methods facilitated the success of control and preven-
tion measures in the region, which was reflected by the drop in
TD-Rs after April 2014 (Fig. 2 and Table 1) [29, 43]. However,
these results also suggest endemic dynamics of MERS-CoV in
the region with approximately two cases per primary case
between 2012 and 2017.
The Riyadh outbreaks were characterised by a large number of
virus introductionswith distinct genetic diversity, whileMakkahout-
breaks, like Eastern Province, were characterised by high intensity of
human-to-human transmission [22]. These human-to-human
transmissions were dominated by healthcare-associated cases [44].
Therefore, it was suggested that hospital-associated transmission
had a larger role than direct contact with an infected camel in the
spread and maintenance of the virus in the GCC region [44]. Thus,
both regions are important epicentres for MERS-CoV spread and
maintenance in the Arabian Peninsula.
Eifan et al. used similar incidence data reported between May
2013 and May 2015 to calculate the reproductive numbers and
concluded that the impact of reported sporadic cases in Saudi
Arabia was insignificant and, subsequently, suggested that there
was little zoonotic influence on MERS-CoV transmission dynam-
ics [45]. Furthermore, the study concluded insignificant progres-
sion of MERS-CoV epidemic after 2015 in multiple geographical
regions within Saudi Arabia [45]. However, our inferred TD-Rs
suggest a significant epidemic progression from 2013 to 2017,
which sustained itself perhaps in camels to reach an endemic
state in the Arabian Peninsula [38–40]. In addition, the temporal
frame of region-specific TD-Rs inferred from the three major
Saudi Arabian geographical areas mostly agreed with the temporal
dynamics of significant TD-Rs inferred from the non-stratified
analyses, discussed above (Figs 2 and 3). Furthermore, according
to the WHO and Saudi MoH [2, 3], the last incident cases were
detected in February and March 2018 in Saudi Arabia and
Table 1. Summary of significant time-dependent reproductive numbers (TD-Rs)
and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) for Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the Arabian Peninsula from June 2012 to July 2017
Week Month-year TD-Ra (95% CIb)
All GCCc countries
92 March-2014 2.58 (1.50–3.83)
93 March-2014 2.72 (1.75–3.88)
94 April-2014 3.39 (1.67–5.67)
95 April-2014 4.00 (2.50–5.50)
96 April-2014 4.01 (3.20–4.87)
97 April-2014 2.51 (2.23–2.79)
98 April-2014 1.191 (1.01–1.33)
139 February-2015 2.03 (1.36–2.73)
165 August-2015 2.02 (1.43–2.64)
166 August-2015 1.69 (1.21–2.21)
257 May-2017 2.65 (1.37–4.10)
259 June-2017 2.23 (1.54–2.85)
Eastern province
46 April-2013 8.27 (4.00–13.00)
47 May-2013 16.79 (12.00–21.00)***
139 February-2015 2.32 (1.34–3.33)
Riyadh
96 April-2014 3.03 (2.11–3.89)
97 April-2014 3.47 (2.29–4.71)
163 July-2015 2.38 (1.50–3.33)
165 August-2015 2.36 (1.78–3.00)
166 August-2015 1.97 (1.47–2.47)
207 June-2016 6.02 (2.00–10.00)
208 June-2016 7.43 (3.00–12.00)
257 May-2017 2.50 (1.43–3.68)
259 June-2017 2.28 (1.70–2.83)
Makkah
95 April-2014 4.98 (3.00–7.00)
96 April-2014 7.63 (5.33–10.00)
97 April-2014 2.52 (2.25–2.78)
239 January-2017 2.32 (1.50–5.00)
240 January-2017 3.21 (2.20–8.00)
aTime-dependant reproductive number.
b95% confidence interval.
cGulf Council Countries.
***Super-spreading event.
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Oman. One of the 2018 Saudi cases died from MERS-CoV infec-
tion due to contact with camel in the Riyadh region [2]. This con-
firms the notion that MERS-CoV continues to maintain itself in
the camel–human transmission cycle in the Arabian Peninsula,
as suggested elsewhere [46].
Our inferred TD-Rs for the three regions of Saudi Arabia did
not demonstrate evidence for seasonality of MERS-CoV outbreaks
(Fig. 2 and Table 1); instead, they showed erratic behaviour
through the period of the present study. However, using repro-
ductive numbers and/or observed incident case series are not
valid tools for quantifying temporal patterns of infectious disease
outbreaks, as demonstrated in the past MERS-CoV studies [23].
Therefore, a valid statistical presentation of seasonality is needed
to properly guide intervention efforts.
In this study, our time-series analyses indicate that temporal
patterns of MERS-CoV incident cases across the primary infected
regions of Saudi Arabia were similar in Eastern Province and
Makkah, but different in Riyadh region (Fig. 3). Our ARIMA
results statistically demonstrate that biannual seasonality was evi-
dent in the Riyadh region (Fig. 3b) as shown by coefficients of the
trigonometric covariates included in the model (Table 2). Indeed,
Riyadh is the capital of Saudi Arabia, and like Eastern Province, is
densely populated with camels and characterised by heavy sea-
sonal camel-related activities (e.g. grazing, movement, trade and
Fig. 3. Reported cases and fitted values of ARIMA mod-
els with their 95% confidence intervals (CI) over the
course of the Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome cor-
onavirus (MERS-CoV) in Saudi Arabia from June 2012
to July 2017. Grey lines represent number of reported
cases, green lines represent fitted number of cases,
and red dotted lines represent 95% CI for the predicted
number of cases for (a) Eastern Province, (b) Riyadh and
(c) Makkah. Places where the green and red lines are
discontinued represents the peaks with more than 20
cases, which have been excluded from the time-series
analyses.
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mating) [47]. Also, Riyadh hosts seasonal camel racing events
from April to October, during which camels mostly come from
the eastern and central regions of Arabia. During these annual
racing events, camels are usually transported in large trucks
from their local ranches, crossing borders to different cities and
race track sites within Saudi Arabia and other GCC counties to
Riyadh [48].
In Eastern Province, no statistical evidence of seasonality was
identified (Fig. 3a). Instead, an endemic pattern of MERS-CoV
cases, with sporadic outbreaks, was the best-fitting model for the
incident case series of the Eastern Province (Table 2). Eastern
Province is a major agricultural area and the most camel densely
populated region on the level of the whole Arabian Peninsula.
Besides, Eastern Province is the only geographical hub that is char-
acterised by a massive network of camel movement and exchange
between the countries of the GCC throughout the year [38, 47].
These characteristics led to the circulation, establishment and
maintenance of an endemic state of MERS-CoV in the Eastern
Province camel populations [47]. Furthermore, the annual
movements of camels from Eastern province to Riyadh might
constitute an important dispersal route of season zoonotic
infection between human and camels [46].
Like Eastern Province, our ARIMA model for Makkah region
inferred an endemic state of MERS-CoV with sporadic outbreak
pattern (Table 2; Fig. 3c). This could be due to the fact that the
frequency of zoonotic transmission was substantially lower in
Makkah than in Riyadh and Eastern Province, and a higher per-
centage of the cases resulted from human-to-human transmission
[22]. However, the role of annual holy pilgrimage held in Makkah
(where millions of people around the world gather in a mass reli-
gious ceremony) remains controversial in the human-to-human
transmission of MERS-CoV [49]. The pilgrimage season depends
on the Islamic calendar, measured by moon phases, rather than
the Gregorian calendar, which is more associated with annual
climate seasonality. Therefore, we were not surprised that our
best-fitting time-series model did not include seasonality for
Makkah (Fig. 3c). Finally, there are distinct cultural and
socio-economic differences between the three regions. Hence,
one would expect that MERS-CoV temporal dynamics would
behave differently across major regions of Saudi Arabia.
Reporting bias and lack of information on the time of imple-
mentation of intervention measures might substantially bias the
estimates of our temporal analyses, and hence it is a limitation
of the present study [29, 50]. Furthermore, it is expected that
surveillance efforts in Saudi Arabia were mainly focused on the
capital, followed by the Makkah (as the holy city of pilgrimage),
where major high-end health facilities are located. Thus, outbreak
data used in our study may have been biased towards regions with
higher surveillance capabilities, leading to inferences skewed
towards these regions, as in the case of Riyadh. This example of
reporting bias has implications for the inferred temporal dynam-
ics of the epidemic at regional levels. However, although Eastern
Province had the lowest number of cases, we detected a unique
super-spreading event in 2013 (Figs 2 and 3). This gives us con-
fidence that the overall results of our temporal analyses are not
skewed towards high-reporting region like Riyadh.
Another limitation of the present study is that we were unable
to analyse the temporal pattern of MERS-CoV in other GCC
countries. As mentioned above, the wide range of seasonal
camel activities occurring within and between GCC countries
should result in larger numbers of cases. This is, again, attributed
to the reporting bias reflected by the inconsistent surveillance cap-
abilities of the GCC countries, as well as related to their conser-
vative culture and strong attachment to their camel herds [51].
Out of all the GCC countries, only Saudi Arabia provided public
information through their government health page with consist-
ent updates on the case status, while other countries only reported
to international organisations, such as OIE and WHO. However,
Saudi Arabia is substantially larger than other GCC countries, and
therefore, epidemic magnitude and size might be proportional to
the size of the affected country. It is worth noting that MERS-CoV
is characterised by asymptomatic and mild cases, which pose a
great challenge for healthcare practitioners in attempting to iden-
tify and diagnose cases. Hence, under-reporting bias has become
another natural limitation of the present study, as thousands of
cases might have been missed during the current epidemic [52].
Under-reporting bias is expected to be more severe in the earlier
years of the epidemic. Finally, excluding large peaks (which repre-
sents time interval with more than 20 cases) of the epidemic curve
in our ARIMA models represents another important limitation.
Those peaks represent sporadic introductions, which are difficult
to model due to their erratic nature. Furthermore, including such
peaks causes overdispersion, which in turn may bias forecasting
for future incidence of cases. That said, the number of cases fore-
casted by our selected ARIMA models using the time-series data
between 2012 and 2017 was similar to the number of cases
reported in Saudi Arabia between January and June of 2018 [2,
3], which indicate that our analytical approaches were statistically
sounded.
In conclusion, this study characterises the temporal dynamics
of the MERS-CoV epidemic in the Arabian Peninsula between
2012 and 2017, with the goal of assessing and guiding surveillance
efforts in the region. We used two unique approaches for the ana-
lysis of epidemic curve (or time-series) data to quantify disease
progression and model specific temporal patterns on a regional
level. In both analytical approaches, we accounted for geograph-
ical variability between three affected regions in Saudi Arabia
including Eastern Province, Riyadh and Makkah. Our inferred
TD-Rs indicate relatively large epidemic sizes, mainly on the
level of the whole country, with significant progression until
2017 (TD-Rs > 1). In both Makkah and Riyadh regions, the epi-
demic progression reached its peak in April 2014 (TD-Rs > 7),
where most of the MERS-CoV cases were reported. However, a
super-spreading event (TD-R > 10) was identified in May 2013
in Eastern province, which comprised the most notable incident
cases of human-to-human transmission. Our best-fitting
Table 2. Summary table for the fitted ARIMA models for three major infected
regions of Saudi Arabia
Region
ARIMA model (S.E. for the model’s
coefficients)a AICb
Eastern
province
Xt =−0.54Xt−1 + 0.56Xt−2 + 0.91Xt−3 + Zt + 0.66Zt−1
881.75
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.21)
Yt = 2.00 – 0.15 sin (2πt/26) – 1.02 cos (2πt/26) + Xt
1191.29
(0.49) (0.52) (0.52)
Riyadh where
Xt = 0.50Xt–1 + 0.21Xt–2
(0.07) (0.07)
Makkah Xt− Xt−1 = Zt − 0.54Zt−1
947.03
(0.08)
aStandard errors of the model’s coefficient.
bAkaike Information Criteria.
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ARIMA model inferred statistically significant biannual seasonal-
ity in Riyadh region, a region characterised by heavy seasonal
camel-related activities. However, no statistical evidence of sea-
sonality was identified in Eastern Province and Makkah.
Instead, both regions were characterised by endemic pattern of
cases with sporadic outbreaks. While the data used in the present
study have inherit limitations, we demonstrated that continuous
modelling efforts of publicly available MERS-CoV data can play
a significant role in shedding new insights into the epidemiology
of the virus. These insights include new inferences about epidemic
progression and evidence for seasonality. Such new epidemio-
logical inferences may provide further guidance to currently
implemented risk-based surveillance efforts in high-risk popula-
tions and, subsequently, improve related interventions strategies
against the epidemic on the country and regional levels.
Acknowledgement. None.
Financial support. This study received no specific grants from funding
agencies and was not intended for profit or commercial use. IRTA is supported
by CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya.
Conflict of interest. None.
Ethical standards. None.
References
1. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2013) Updated information
on the epidemiology of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) infection and guidance for the public, clinicians, and public
health authorities, 2012–2013. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 62,
793–796.
2. Command and Control Center, Ministry of Health, Saudi Arabia,
Middles Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus Daily statistics.
Available at http://www.moh.gov.sa/CCC/PressReleases/Pages/default.aspx
(Accessed August 2018).
3. WHO (World Health Organization). Coronavirus infections; Disease
outbreak news. Available at http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/
en/ (Accessed August 2018).
4. Bialek SR et al. (2014) First confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in the United States,
updated information on the epidemiology of MERS-CoV infection, and
guidance for the public, clinicians, and public health authorities – May
2014. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 63, 431–436.
5. Korean Society of InfectiousD,Korean Society forHealthcare-associated
Infection C, Prevention (2015) An unexpected outbreak of Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection in the Republic of Korea,
2015. Journal of Infection and Chemotherapy 47, 120–122.
6. Zumla A et al. (2016) Infectious diseases epidemic threats and mass gath-
erings: refocusing global attention on the continuing spread of the Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). BMC Medicine 14,
132.
7. Azhar EI et al. (2014) Evidence for camel-to-human transmission of
MERS coronavirus. The New England Journal of Medicine 370, 2499–
2505.
8. Alraddadi BM et al. (2016) Risk factors for primary Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus illness in humans, Saudi Arabia, 2014.
Emerging Infectious Diseases 22, 49–55.
9. Lau SK et al. (2013) Genetic characterization of betacoronavirus lineage C
viruses in bats reveals marked sequence divergence in the spike protein of
pipistrellus bat coronavirus HKU5 in Japanese pipistrelle: implications for
the origin of the novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
Journal of Virology 87, 8638–8650.
10. Du L and Han GZ (2016) Deciphering MERS-CoV evolution in dromed-
ary camels. Trends in Microbiology 24, 87–89.
11. Assiri A et al. (2013) Epidemiological, demographic, and clinical charac-
teristics of 47 cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus dis-
ease from Saudi Arabia: a descriptive study. The Lancet Infectious Diseases
13, 752–761.
12. Majumder MS et al. (2015) Mortality risk factors for Middle East respira-
tory syndrome outbreak, South Korea, 2015. Emerging Infectious Diseases
21, 2088–2090.
13. WHO (World Health Organization). Summary of Current Situation,
Literature Update and Risk Assessment. Available at http://www.who.int/
emergencies/mers-cov/risk-assessment-july-2017.pdf?ua= (Accessed August
2018).
14. Zaki AM et al. (2012) Isolation of a novel coronavirus from a man with
pneumonia in Saudi Arabia. The New England Journal of Medicine 367,
1814–1820.
15. Al-Tawfiq JA (2013) Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus infec-
tion: an overview. Journal of Infection and Public Health 6, 319–322.
16. Shehata MM et al. (2016) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus:
a comprehensive review. Frontiers in Medicine 10, 120–136.
17. Fagbo SF et al. (2015) Molecular epidemiology of hospital outbreak of
Middle East respiratory syndrome, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2014. Emerging
Infectious Diseases 21, 1981–1988.
18. Cauchemez S et al. (2016) Unraveling the drivers of MERS-CoV trans-
mission. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA
113, 9081–9086.
19. Mohd HA et al. (2016) Predictors of MERS-CoV infection: a large case
control study of patients presenting with ILI at a MERS-CoV referral hos-
pital in Saudi Arabia. Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease 14, 464–470.
20. Banik GR et al. (2016) Risk factors for severity and mortality in patients
with MERS-CoV: analysis of publicly available data from Saudi Arabia.
Virologica Sinica 31, 81–84.
21. Majumder MS et al. (2014) Estimation of MERS-coronavirus reproduct-
ive number and case fatality rate for the spring 2014 Saudi Arabia out-
break: insights from publicly available data. PLoS Currents 6,
ecurrents.outbreaks.98d2f8f3382d84f390736cd5f5fe133c.
22. Poletto C, Colizza V and Boëlle P-Y (2016) Quantifying spatiotemporal
heterogeneity of MERS-CoV transmission in the Middle East region: a
combined modelling approach. Epidemics 15, 1–9.
23. NahK et al. (2016) Predicting the international spread ofMiddle East respira-
tory syndrome (MERS). Statistical Methods in Medical Research 16, 356.
24. Dietz K (1993) The estimation of the basic reproduction number for
infectious diseases. Statistical Methods in Medical Research 2, 23–41.
25. Breban R, Riou J and Fontanet A (2013) Interhuman transmissibility of
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: estimation of pandemic
risk. The Lancet 382, 694–699.
26. Jornet-Sanz M et al. (2017) A Bayesian stochastic SIRS model with a vac-
cination strategy for the analysis of respiratory syncytial virus.
SORT-Statistics and Operation Research Transactions 41, 159–176.
27. Fernandez-Fontelo A et al. (2016) Under-reported data analysis with
INAR-hidden Markov chains. Statistics in Medicine 35, 4875–4890.
28. FAO. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). EMPRES Global
Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i). Available at http://
empres-i.fao.org/ (Accessed May 2016).
29. Wallinga J and Teunis P (2004) Different epidemic curves for severe
acute respiratory syndrome reveal similar impacts of control measures.
American Journal of Epidemiology 160, 509–516.
30. Obadia T, Haneef R and Boelle PY (2012) The R0 package: a toolbox to
estimate reproduction numbers for epidemic outbreaks. BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making 12, 147.
31. Haydon DT et al. (2003) The construction and analysis of epidemic trees
with reference to the 2001 UK foot-and-mouth outbreak. Proceedings:
Biological Sciences 270, 121–127.
32. Alba A et al. (2015) Exploring the surveillance potential of mortality data:
nine years of bovine fallen stock data collected in Catalonia (Spain). PLoS
ONE 10, e0122547.
33. Song X et al. (2016) Time series analysis of influenza incidence in Chinese
provinces from 2004 to 2011. Medicine (Baltimore) 95, e3929.
34. Brockwell PJ and Davis RA. (1996) Introduction to Time Series and
Forecasting. New York: Springer, p. xiii, 420 p.
Epidemiology and Infection 9
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268818002728
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IRTA, on 14 Jan 2019 at 13:32:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
35. Hemida MG et al. (2013) Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) cor-
onavirus seroprevalence in domestic livestock in Saudi Arabia, 2010 to
2013. Euro Surveillance 18, 20659.
36. Perera RA et al. (2013) Seroepidemiology for MERS coronavirus using
microneutralisation and pseudoparticle virus neutralisation assays reveal
a high prevalence of antibody in dromedary camels in Egypt, June 2013.
Euro Surveillance 18, 20574.
37. Memish ZA et al. (2014) Human infection with MERS coronavirus after
exposure to infected camels, Saudi Arabia, 2013. Emerging Infectious
Diseases 20, 1012–1015.
38. Meyer B et al. (2014) Antibodies against MERS coronavirus in dromedary
camels, United Arab Emirates, 2003 and 2013. Emerging Infectious
Diseases 20, 552–559.
39. Nowotny N and Kolodziejek J (2014) Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in dromedary camels, Oman, 2013. Euro
Surveillance 19, 20781.
40. Raj VS et al. (2014) Isolation of MERS coronavirus from a Dromedary
camel, Qatar, 2014. Emerging Infectious Diseases 20, 1339–1342.
41. Corman VM et al. (2014) Performance and clinical validation of the
RealStar MERS-CoV Kit for detection of Middle East respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus RNA. Journal of Clinical Virology 60, 168–171.
42. Al Johani S and Hajeer AH (2016) MERS-CoV diagnosis: an update.
Journal of Infection and Public Health 9, 216–219.
43. Madani TA, Althaqafi AO and Alraddadi BM (2014) Infection prevention
and control guidelines for patients with Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection. Saudi Medical Journal 35, 897–913.
44. Memish ZA et al. (2015) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV): a cluster analysis with implications for global manage-
ment of suspected cases. Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease 13,
311–314.
45. Eifan SA et al. (2017) A pandemic risk assessment of Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Journal of
Biological Sciences 24, 1631–1638.
46. Dudas G et al. (2018) MERS-CoV spillover at the camel-human interface.
Elife 7, e31257.
47. HemidaMG et al. (2015)Dromedary camels and the transmission ofMiddle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Transboundary and
Emerging Diseases 39, 243–261.
48. Khalaf S (2000) Poetics and politics of newly invented traditions in the
gulf: camel racing in the United Arab Emirates. Ethnology 39, 243–261.
49. Alqahtani AS et al. (2016) Camel exposure and knowledge about
MERS-CoV among Australian Hajj pilgrims in 2014. Virologica Sinica
31, 89–93.
50. Williams JR et al. (2003) Heterogeneity in regional notification patterns
and its impact on aggregate national case notification data: the example
of measles in Italy. BMC Public Health 3, 23.
51. Cauchemez S et al. (2014) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus:
quantification of the extent of the epidemic, surveillance biases, and trans-
missibility. The Lancet Infectious Diseases 14, 50–56.
52. Muller MA et al. (2015) Presence of Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus antibodies in Saudi Arabia: a nationwide, cross-sectional,
serological study. The Lancet Infectious Diseases 15, 629.
10 M. A. Alkhamis et al.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268818002728
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IRTA, on 14 Jan 2019 at 13:32:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
